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Abstract In everyday life it is often important to have a mental model of the knowl-
edge, beliefs, desires, and intentions of other people. Sometimes it is even useful to to
have a correct model of their model of our own mental states: a second-order Theory
of Mind. In order to investigate to what extent adults use and acquire complex skills
and strategies in the domains of Theory of Mind and the related skill of natural lan-
guage use, we conducted an experiment. It was based on a strategic game of imperfect
information, in which it was beneficial for participants to have a good mental model of
their opponent, and more specifically, to use second-order Theory of Mind. It was also
beneficial for them to be aware of pragmatic inferences and of the possibility to choose
between logical and pragmatic language use. We found that most participants did not
seem to acquire these complex skills during the experiment when being exposed to
the game for a number of different trials. Nevertheless, some participants did make
use of advanced cognitive skills such as second-order Theory of Mind and appropriate
choices between logical and pragmatic language use from the beginning. Thus, the
results differ markedly from previous research.
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1 Introduction
In everyday life, people frequently make use of their ability to reason about others and
to infer the implicit meaning of sentences. Consider the following two situations:
Situation 1 You are called by a friend who asks you for a phone number. You know
the number by heart, so you ask her whether she has pen and paper. She answers you
with “No, I don’t”. Can you conclude that she also does not have a pencil and paper
ready?
Situation 2 You are playing happy families 1 and you are the first to pose a question.
You ask your opponent for the ‘elephant’ of the family ‘mammals’. Your opponent
replies with “No, I don’t have this card”. Can you conclude that he doesn’t have any
member of the mammals family?
In the first case, you know that your friend has the desire to be cooperative and thus
your reasoning would be something like: She does not have a pencil, for if she did she
would have told me so, since she knows it is relevant. In the second case you know
that your opponent does not want you to know which cards he has, since he has the
desire to win the game. You therefore are aware that he would not tell you whether he
has any other members of the family, unless he really had to, so you do not conclude
that he does not have them.
These examples point out that people use their knowledge about the situation and
about others to determine the meaning of a sentence. It would be interesting to know
how humans use and acquire such skills. In the study described in this article, we
investigated to what extent adults use and acquire complex skills in the domains of
reasoning about others and language use. We are particularly interested in Theory of
Mind, the cognitive capacity to understand and predict external behavior of others and
oneself by attributing internal mental states, such as knowledge, beliefs, and inten-
tions (Premack and Woodruff 1978). Readers of this journal, being well-trained in
logic, are probably quite capable of using nested forms of Theory of Mind and have
little difficulty interpreting sentences like “Johan does not know that Alice knows
that it is not common knowledge among logicians that Patrick has written a novel
under pseudonym” or analyzing games that require sophisticated forms of recursive
reasoning about strategies. Introspection suffices to know that, at least in some cir-
cumstances, some people can reason correctly at various levels of Theory of Mind,
and no experiment can deny this. However, for a more general question such as “under
what conditions do people generally engage in Theory of Mind, to which degree do
they apply it correctly, and can they learn to apply it in an unusual context?", empirical
research is needed. This article presents some experimental findings indicating that
the degree to which people correctly apply Theory of Mind, may be rather less than
is often assumed.
Many empirical studies of human reasoning involving formal models like logic have
brazenly concluded that logics are not at all adequate as models for human reasoning
1 In some countries this game is called ‘quartets’.
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(see for example Wason 1966; Johnson-Laird 1983). Our stance towards these formal
models is much friendlier. We find that logics help at least to formulate empirical
questions precisely, for example by clearly delineating different orders of Theory of
Mind (e.g. in Parikh 2003), and we gratefully use logics in this modest way in the
current article. It is our ambitious aim for future research to create flexible formal
logical models that are tailored, more closely than the currently available epistemic
logics, to individual human capabilities of applying Theory of Mind.
As a focus of our experiments, we use the highly specialized context of a com-
petitive new game of imperfect information called Mastersminds. In this adversarial
context, in contrast to the cooperative context usually used in discourse understanding
experiments, learning seems bound to be necessary. More specifically, both learning to
strategically apply second-order Theory of Mind and learning to produce and interpret
uncooperative communication are expected.
In the next section, we describe a number of theories relevant to the present study.
Section 3 describes our research question and hypotheses. To test these hypotheses, we
conducted an experiment in which participants played a game against each other. This
game was a variant of the game Mastermind. We describe the experimental setup and
the predictions, followed by the results of the experiment. Then follow a discussion of
the results and the conclusions that can be drawn from this study. In the last section,
we present some ideas for future work.
2 Background: Formal Models for Real People
Several research enterprises have been combined in this study. First of all, we will give
a reminder of the empirical investigation of Theory of Mind and its formal counter-
part, the logic of knowledge (epistemic logic). Then we shortly describe game theory
and its application to the game of Mastersminds used in our experiments. This is fol-
lowed by a description of pragmatic and logical interpretations of scalar terms, which
will play a role in the feedback sentences employed in Mastersminds. We close the
section with a short overview of different theories about the interplay between con-
trolled and automated processes in the acquisition of all complex skills relevant for
our experiments: higher-order Theory of Mind, strategic game playing, and pragmatic
and logical language use.
2.1 Theory of Mind Use
One of the advanced skills that we are interested in is the use of Theory of Mind
(ToM). Although normally developing children from the age of around five are able to
distinguish between their own mental states and those of others, Keysar et al. (2003)
argue that even adults do not reliably use this sophisticated ability to interpret the
actions of others. They found a stark dissociation between the ability to reflectively
distinguish one’s own beliefs from others’, and the routine deployment of this ability
in interpreting the actions of others. The second didn’t take place in their experiment.
In other experiments by the same research group, similar results were found (Keysar
et al. 1998, 2000; Horton and Keysar 1996).
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To have a first-order ToM is to assume that someone’s beliefs, thoughts and desires
influence one’s behavior. A first-order thought could be: ‘He does not know that his
book is on the table’. In second-order ToM it is also recognized that to predict others’
behavior, the desires and beliefs that they have of one’s self and the predictions of
oneself by others must be taken into account. So, for example, you can realize that
what someone expects you to do will affect his behavior. For example, ‘(I know) he
does not know that I know his book is on the table’ would be part of my second-order
ToM. To have a third-order ToM is to assume others to have a second-order ToM, etc.
In defining the different orders, two choices have been made. The first is that to
increase the order, another agent must be involved. ‘I know his book is on the table’
and ‘I know I know his book is on the table’ are said to be of the same order. A
motivation for this choice is that these statements are equivalent in the system S5,
which is used in epistemic logic (see Subsect. 2.2). So for the order to increase, the
agents that the knowledge is about must be different. Here we abstract away from
the discussion in (Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Dunin-Ke¸plicz and Verbrugge 2006) that
in reality, people do not perfectly reason about their own knowledge and ignorance.
Thus epistemic logic is an idealized model with respect to human powers of reflective
introspection, too, but in this article we concentrate on people reasoning about one
another.
The second choice we made is to consider both ‘I know p’ and p to be zeroth-order
knowledge for atomic propositions p. This mainly is a matter of speech. The fact p
in itself, which can be true or false, only becomes knowledge when it is known by
someone. So only when someone knows that p, p can be considered zeroth-order
knowledge.
2.2 Epistemic Logic
Epistemic logic is a type of modal logic that can be used to describe the knowledge
and beliefs of an agent, or a system of agents. In epistemic logic, the Ki operator
represents that agent i knows something. For example, K1 p means agent 1 knows
p. By definition, an agent can only know things that are true, reflected in the ‘truth
axiom’ Kiϕ → ϕ for all formulas ϕ.
The Ki operator can take scope over an epistemic formula. For example, K1(p →
q) for agent 1 knows that p implies q, or K1 K2 p for agent 1 knows that agent 2 knows
that p. Especially the last example is of interest here. By nesting of the modal operator
Ki , knowledge from different orders of Theory of Mind can be represented.
This is relevant to describe knowledge of agents playing Mastermind, a game of
which we use a variant. Mastermind is a game in which player 2 has to guess the
secret code of four colors, that is composed by player 1. In reply to each guess made
by player 2, player 1 has to specify how many colors from that guess match colors in
the secret code, and how many of these are in the right place.
The fact that agent 1 has the first-order knowledge that agent 2 knows that red occurs
in agent 1’s secret code of four colors could be represented by K1 K2 p, where p means
Red occurs in the secret code of agent 1. In a similar way, K1 K2 K1 p would mean that
agent 1 knows that agent 2 knows that agent 1 knows that red is in his secret code. This
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knowledge that agent 2 knows that agent 1 knows that p is part of the second-order
Theory of Mind of agent 1. The first Ki operator only specifies whose knowledge is
represented, whereas the ones following are part of that knowledge itself.
The standard system S5 of epistemic logic, in addition to the truth axiom mentioned
above, contains two more axioms. Kiϕ → Ki Kiϕ (‘positive introspection’) expresses
that agents are aware of what they know. On the other hand, ¬Kiϕ → Ki¬Kiϕ (‘neg-
ative introspection’) expresses that agents are aware of their ignorance. As mentioned
before, these reflective properties make for a rather idealized formal model of human
reasoning.
In addition to the Ki operator, the dual Mi operator represents what an agent
thinks that might be (i.e. what is consistent with his information), and is defined by
Miϕ ⇔ ¬Ki¬ϕ. The Bi operator represents what an agent believes, the Di operator
what an agent desires, and the Ii operator what an agent intends. When considering a
finite system of multiple agents, two more operators are of interest. E , for every one
knows that, and C for it is common knowledge that. Agents are said to have common
knowledge of p if it is the case that everyone knows that p (so Ep), everyone knows
that Ep, E Ep, etcetera ad infinitum. For more on epistemic logic and its possible
worlds semantics, see (Fagin et al. 1995; Meyer and van der Hoek 2004; Van der Hoek
and Verbrugge 2002).
2.3 Strategic Games
According to game theory, a game is being played whenever people interact with each
other. Game theory provides a way to formally describe and categorize games and
strategies. It has successfully been applied to problems in economics, political sci-
ence, biology and social philosophy. A strategy in game theory is defined in a formal
way. To understand strategies, let us first look at games. A game must have rules,
which specify for each player what can be done at what point in time. In addition, the
rules should specify how the players are rewarded at the end of the game.
A game can be represented as a game tree. The root of the tree represents the first
move of the game; for example, in Fig. 1, the root is the leftmost node at the top. The
leaves correspond to possible game endings and should be labeled with the outcomes
of the game for each player; for example in Fig. 1, the rightmost leaf at the bottom is
labeled 2,4 corresponding to an outcome of 2 for player 1 and 4 for player 2. Each node
represents a possible move and the player who is to move, while the edges leading
away from a node represent the actions possible at that point in the game; for example,
the root in Fig. 1 is labeled 1 to represent that it is player 1’s turn and there are two
edges leading out, which are labeled with capital letters corresponding to player 1’s
possible choices, either to go R (to the Right) or D (Down); player 2’s choices at the
second node are labeled with the corresponding lowercase letters. A play then consists
of a connected chain of edges, from the root to one of the leaves. A pure strategy for
player i can now be defined as ‘a statement that specifies an action at each of the
decision nodes at which it would be player i’s duty to make a decision if that node
were actually reached’ (Horton and Keysar 1996).
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Fig. 1 Game tree for the centipede game
The knowledge that is relevant to the game, that a player has at a particular point
in time is represented in game theory as an information set. Information can be either
perfect or imperfect. In bridge, information is imperfect, because players do not know
the hands of other players. This is different from the game of chess, a perfect infor-
mation game where each player always knows everything there is to know about the
current state of the game, because both players can see the board and the positions
of the pieces. In a game of imperfect information, a pure strategy needs to specify
what action a player performs at each possible information set (see (Binmore 1992)
for more on game theory).
The game used our experiment, a symmetric version of Mastermind, is far more
complex. It has been designed by Grachten and Druiven and described by (Kooi 2000)
and is called Mastersminds. We have used a variant that makes it suitable for our exper-
iment. Mastersminds is a two-player zero-sum game. Zero-sum means that the pay-offs
of all players always sum to zero: if one player wins, the other player loses, so the
game is strictly competitive. In our variant of Mastersminds, each player has a secret
code of four different, ordered colors, and has to guess the secret code of the opponent
in order to win. This can be done by making guesses and receiving feedback sentences
on how many colors are right, and how many of them are in the right position. Each
turn, one player makes a guess about the other player’s array of colors. In addition to
receiving feedback sentences, this player also evaluates this same guess about his own
array of colors and sends this information to his opponent by selecting sentences.
The game tree for Mastersminds would become extremely large, because there
are many possible ways for the game to evolve. In addition, the information players
have depends on what choices their opponent makes, which results in many possible
information sets. Therefore, it would be very impractical to define a formal strategy
for this version of Mastersminds: already for the classical asymmetric Mastermind,
nobody knows a winning strategy (but see Kooi 2005). However, global strategies for
Masterminds can be described, such as ‘revealing little information’ or ‘concentrating
on guessing the opponent’s secret code’. In the empirical part of the article, strategy
is used in this less formal way.
2.4 Game Theory and Real People
In classical game theory, it is often assumed that there is common knowledge that
players are rational and capable of perfect reasoning. For Mastersminds, this is not a
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plausible assumption. It would imply that all players would be capable of unboundedly
high order ToM reasoning. Game theory has often been criticized for the assumption
of perfect reasoning. In fact, many experimental studies have shown that people do not
always follow rational strategies, for example, they do not do so in so-called centipede
games (introduced in Rosenthal 1981). Let us remind the reader of these games of
perfect information, using the small example of Fig. 1.
In this centipede game, two players take turns choosing either to take a larger share
of the current amount of marbles, namely two more than the opponent (down in the
picture), thereby ending the game; or alternatively, to pass the choice to the other
player (right in the picture), which leads to an increase of the total available amount
of marbles by two. In the picture, The pay-offs for each player are represented at the
leaves, and the amount of marbles at the start of the game is one. If player 1 starts
choosing ‘down’, he receives one marble while player 2 receives nothing; if, on the
other hand, player 1 chooses ‘right’, the available amount increases by two. At the
next turn, if player 2 chooses ‘down’, she receives two marbles while player 1 receives
nothing, and so on.
Now we can demonstrate the relevance of common knowledge of rationality by
using backward induction. Let r1 denote that player 1 is rational, and r2 that player 2
is rational. At the fourth and last choice point from the left, using r2, we can infer that
2 will prefer four marbles to three ones and she will choose ‘down’. Since rationality
of both players is common knowledge, we know that K1r2, hence, when in the third
choice point, player 1 knows that player 2 will choose ‘down’ in the fourth choice
point, and hence, since player 1 is rational and prefers three marbles over two ones,
he will choose ‘Down’. Since K2 K1r2 ∧ K2r1, if player 2 were to reach the second
choice point from the left, she would apply the same reasoning that we just did and
conclude that player 1 will play ‘Down’ in the third choice point, so player 2, being
rational, will play ‘down’ in the second choice point. Continuing this line of reasoning,
and using the fact that K1 K2 K1r2 ∧ K1 K2r1, we can conclude that player 1 will play
‘Down’ at the start. Therefore, if there were common knowledge of rationality, then
backward induction, which is based on high orders of Theory of Mind, could be used
by the first player in a centipede game to conclude that he should immediately opt for
the first dead-end and stop the game (see also Van der Hoek and Verbrugge 2002).
It seems paradoxical that reasoning on the basis of common knowledge of rational-
ity leads to a less than optimal outcome for both players. Indeed, empirical research
has shown that instead of immediately taking the ‘down’ option, players often show
partial cooperation, moving right for several moves before eventually choosing to
take the down option (McKelvey and Palfrey 1992; Nagel and Tang 1998). Nagel and
Tang suggest as possible reason for this deviation from the game-theoretic outcome
that players sometimes have reason to believe that their opponent could be an altruist
who always cooperates (by moving to the right). In such a case, it is better to join
the altruist in going to the right and then defect on the last round. In (Van Eijck and
Verbrugge 2008), Van Benthem and Van Eijck present a Platonic dialogue on Game
theory, logic, and rational choice that offers an intriguing and sophisticated logical
analysis of backward induction and its rival strategies.
Another possible explanation of human behavior in the centipede game involves
error and cognitive limits: if the opponent has not correctly performed the full backward
123
496 R. Verbrugge, L. Mol
induction, it may be advantageous to cooperate in the first rounds. On this line of cog-
nitive limits, Hedden and Zhang, Colman and many others have shown that in reality,
players hardly use backward induction at all and make use of only first-order or sec-
ond-order ToM (Hedden and Zhang 2002; Colman 2003). Hedden and Zhang used a
game of perfect information very similar to the centipede game and found that adult
subjects would start using at most first-order theory of mind. Gradually, a number
of subjects would shift to second-order theory of mind when they started modeling
their opponent as a first-order reasoner (Hedden and Zhang 2002, but see Flobbe et al.
2008) in this issue for an alternative interpretation and experiments).
It would be interesting to see if similar learning to apply higher orders of ToM
as proposed by Hedden and Zhang occurs in Mastersminds, our game of imperfect
information. It is known that backward induction cannot be applied to games of imper-
fect information, so the formal model of computing an optimal solution consisting of
pure strategies (technically, a subgame-perfect equilibrium) by backward induction as
described above, does not apply to Mastersminds (Binmore 1992).
2.5 Pragmatic Inferences
Besides ToM reasoning and strategic reasoning, a third skill that we investigate is
language use, especially drawing pragmatic inferences. According to Grice (1989),
people use the quantity maxim to infer the implicit meaning of a sentence. The quantity
maxim states that interlocutors should be as informative as is required, yet not more
informative than is necessary.
Using the quantity maxim it can be inferred that, for example, if a teacher says
‘Some students passed the test’, it is the case that not all students passed the test. This
is because if all students would have passed the test, the teacher would have used
the more informative term all instead of the weaker term some, since otherwise the
quantity maxim would have been violated.
Some and all are scalar terms. Scalar terms can be ordered on a scale of pragmatic
strength. A term is said to be stronger if more possibilities are excluded. An example
is 〈a, some, most, all〉 which is ordered from weak to strong. The above phenomenon
of inferring ‘not all students’ from the use of ‘some students’ is an example of a scalar
implicature. In case of a scalar implicature, it is communicated by a weaker claim
(using a scalar term) that a stronger claim (using a more informative term from the
same scale) does not hold.
Feeney et al. (2004), propose that there are three stages to people’s understanding
of some:
(a) the logical (truth-conditional) interpretation which precedes children’s sensitivity
to scalar implicatures;
(b) the pragmatic interpretation which results from drawing pragmatic inferences;
(c) a logical interpretation that results from choice rather than from the incapability
to make the pragmatic inference.
The first two stages are in line with the results in (Noveck 2001) and (Papafragou
and Musolino 2003). Feeney et al. found evidence for a third stage, in which adults
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can choose a logical interpretation over a pragmatic interpretation, even though they
can make the pragmatic inference that some implies not all. They conducted an experi-
ment in which undergraduate students performed a computerized sentence verification
task. They recorded the students’ answers and reaction times. Here are two of the some
sentences they used.
1. Some fish can swim.
2. Some cars are red.
In contrast to the second sentence, the first sentence is infelicitous: world knowl-
edge contradicts the pragmatic conclusion that not all fish can swim, so that the logical
and pragmatic interpretation are in conflict. Feeney et al. found that for participants
who gave logical responses only, reaction times for responses to infelicitous some
sentences such as 1 were longer than those for logically consistent responses to felic-
itous some sentences as 2. Notice that to both sentences the logical response is ‘true’.
The pragmatic response to 2 is ‘true’ as well. The pragmatic response to 1 is ‘false’.
So the sentences in which the logical and pragmatic response are in conflict resulted
in longer reaction times. These results favor a theory that logical responses are due
to inhibition of a response based on the pragmatic interpretation over a theory that
logical responses result from failure to make the pragmatic inference. This suggests
that a more logical language use in adults can be seen as an advanced skill.
An interesting explanation of scalar implicatures based on bidirectional optimality
theory has been presented in (Blutner 2000). Moreover, Dekker and Van Rooij have
convincingly argued for a correspondence between pragmatic inferences according
to bidirectional optimality theory and strategic reasoning in games (Dekker and Van
Rooij 2000; see also Flobbe et al. 2008; Mol 2004). Finally, Benz and Van Rooij
convincingly show that in a cooperative dialogue, optimal assertions are calculated by
using backward induction (see Subsect. 2.3), accounting in a uniform way for scalar
implicatures as well as for several other types of implicature Benz and van Rooij
(2007).
The kinds of discourse usually considered in formal semantics—and the above-
mentioned articles are no exception—concern cooperative communication. We feel
that it is at least as important to investigate adversarial communication, where even if
one has the required information, one provides the interlocutor with as little infor-
mation as one can get away with. Our analysis of the subjects’ discourse in the
experimental study focuses on the contrast between cooperative and adversarial com-
munication. In our model, cooperative communication corresponds with Gricean prag-
matics, whereas adversarial communication corresponds more closely to classical
logic. 2
2 Note that there are alternative viable approaches to this contrast, for example using defeasible, non-
monotonic logics. There, cooperative communication leads to ‘credulous’ inferences (where the conclusion
holds in at least one extension, an intended model of the premises) whereas adversarial communication
leads to ’skeptical’ inferences (where the conclusion should hold in all possible extensions) (Stenning and
van Lambalgen 2008; Antoniou 1997).
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2.6 Learning by Reflection
Human reasoning has often been divided into automatic and controlled processing.
Automatic reasoning is unconscious and is usually modeled in a connectionist archi-
tecture. Controlled reasoning is conscious and is usually modeled in symbolic systems.
Schneider et al. (Schneider and Chein 2003; Schneider and Shiffrin 1977), describe
automatic processing as the activation of a sequence of nodes that “nearly always
becomes active in response to a particular input configuration, [. . .] without the neces-
sity for active control or attention by the subject”. Automatic processes “require an
appreciable amount of consistent training to develop fully”.
Controlled processes on the other hand are described as “a temporary sequence
of nodes activated under control of, and through attention by, the subject.” They
are “tightly capacity limited, but the costs of this capacity limitation are balanced
by the benefits deriving from the ease with which such processes may be set up,
altered, and applied in novel situations for which automatic sequences have never
been learned” (Schneider and Shiffrin 1977).
Classical theory of skill acquisition (Fitts 1964) describes learning as a process of
automation: one starts a new skill in the cognitive stage, in which controlled deliberate
reasoning is needed to perform the task. This stage is characterized by slow perfor-
mance and errors. By repeatedly performing the skill, eventually the autonomous stage
is reached, where performance is fast and automatic, requiring little working memory
capacity. During the process of automation, the control that one has over the process
of performing the task decreases. Deliberate access to automated skills is therefore
limited.
Although this theory can explain many phenomena, it is limited: Skills are usually
considered in isolation, whereas in reality they build on one another. For example, the
skill of multiplication is based on the skill of addition. However, according to Fitts’
theory, mastered and hence automated skills cannot in themselves serve as a basis for
more advanced skills, because deliberate access to automated skills is limited. Hence,
in this classical theory it remains unclear how transfer of knowledge from one skill to
another is possible.
In Karmiloff-Smith (1992), however, it is reported that children can only describe
what they are doing after they have mastered a skill (e.g., in number conservation
experiments). Thus, the capacity for deliberate reasoning sometimes increases rather
than decreases with expertise. This cannot be explained by assuming skill acquisi-
tion to end in the autonomous stage. Sun and Zhang (2004) stress the interaction of
implicit (automatic) and explicit (controlled) reasoning processes during skill acqui-
sition. Evans (2003), argues that most reasoning tasks have automatic and deliberate
components. Other than suggested by Fitt’s theory, the two types of reasoning thus
seem to be closely intertwined.
We suggest that skill acquisition is a continuous interplay between deliberate and
automatic processes. During the initial stages of skill acquisition all deliberation is
focused on basic performance of the task. Once performing the task becomes more
automatic, deliberate processes can shift to reflection on the task. Basic performance
of the task and reflection on the task can be considered dual tasks, both competing
for resources. Once performance becomes more automated, more resources become
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available for reflection. Reflection allows using the skill as a building block for more
complex skills, looking ahead a few steps, or, as is the case in the present study,
reasoning about others’ knowledge (also see (Taatgen 2005)) for examples of how
automation can improve flexibility in reasoning).
We assume that to reach expert level performance in domains such as reasoning
about others, pragmatics, and learning from instruction, deliberate reasoning pro-
cesses, such as self-monitoring, are crucial.
3 Research Question and Hypotheses
The context described in the previous section leads to the following problem statement:
How do deliberate and automatic processes interact in the acquisition of complex
skills? This study is an exploratory investigation, for which we have stated the follow-
ing research question: To what extent do people use and acquire complex skills and
strategies, in the domains of reasoning about others and language use? We have nar-
rowed this down to the specific case of playing Mastersminds, the symmetric version
of the game Mastermind, introduced in Subsect. 2.3. We make use of three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 Performing a task and simultaneously reflecting upon this task can be
seen as a form of dual tasking.
This hypothesis states that when people perform a task that involves reasoning with
incomplete information, or drawing pragmatic inferences, reflection can be considered
a secondary task. The first task includes reasoning based on one’s own knowledge and
the truth-conditional (e.g. logical) meaning of utterances. The second task is more
complex, and includes using reflection to reason about others and to infer from prag-
matically implicated meaning. These tasks compete for resources and their demands
decrease with skill acquisition.
When playing Mastersminds (see Subsect. 2.3 and Sect. 4), the first task is playing
the game according to its rules. This involves reasoning about the game rules and
determining which sentences are true. The second task is developing a winning strat-
egy. This involves reasoning about what the opponent thinks, is trying to make you
think, or thinks that you are trying to make him think, etc., as well as determining what
is pragmatically implicated by an utterance, or which utterances are not only true but
also reveal the least information.
Hypothesis 2 In an uncooperative conversation, people will shift their interpretation
and production of quantifiers from a pragmatic use (according to Grice’s quantity
maxim) to a less pragmatic use (violating Grice’s quantity maxim).
The idea here is that in an uncooperative situation, people will be aware that others
are trying to reveal little information (part of first-order ToM) and therefore will not
be as informative as possible (as the quantity maxim requires). They will therefore not
use the pragmatic inferences that they usually do in interpretation. In addition, people
may develop more logical productions to be less informative themselves.
The reasoning necessary for this change in strategy is part of the secondary task of
reflective cognition. Therefore, people will only be able to make this change when the
first task is sufficiently automated.
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Hypothesis 3 In using quantifiers, people make use of an automated process, which
results in a pragmatic use of the quantifier. This automated process can be ‘overruled’
by a deliberate reasoning process, which results in a logical use of the quantifier.
Hypothesis 3 is on what kind of reasoning is involved in using quantifiers, espe-
cially to make the shift described in hypothesis 2. The theory of three stages that is
proposed in (Feeney et al. 2004) (see Subsect. 2.5) seems in line with the theory of
skill acquisition we propose. If so, the process of making pragmatic inferences should
be an automated process in adults and the ability to overrule this pragmatic interpre-
tation would result from reflective cognition. Once the demands of the first task have
decreased sufficiently, this reflective cognition can take place, resulting in the change
of strategy described in hypothesis 2.
4 Master(s)Mind(s) Experiment
4.1 Participants
All twelve participants were at least 18 years old and had not followed any courses on
the formal theories relevant for the experiment such as epistemic logic, game theory
or linguistic theories. They were native speakers of Dutch.
4.2 Design
Participants had to complete two sessions, each of about three hours, in which they
played a symmetric head to head game via connected computers in the same room.
Participants were facing a different opponent in each session. In this game they had
to correctly guess the secret code, consisting of four different, ordered colors, of their
opponent. Players gave each other feedback by selecting Dutch sentences from a
list. Although not explicitly told to participants, these sentences differed in pragmatic
strength. As proficient players of the game would discover, the game was about gaining
as much information as possible, while at the same time revealing as little information
as possible. Because of this second aspect, the conversation is not fully cooperative
and thus hypothesis 2 is relevant.
During the game, players had to submit their interpretation of the sentences they
received as feedback. They had to submit all the ‘worlds’ that they thought to be
possible given the feedback sentences, using a code: For each right color in the right
position they had to select a black circle and for each color which was correct but in the
wrong place, a white circle. To represent ambiguity and vagueness, participants could
submit more than one combination of black and white circles that they considered
possible.
Let us look at an example. Imagine John having the secret code 1 = red, 2 = blue,
3 = green, 4 = yellow and Mary guessing 1 = red, 2 = orange, 3 = yellow, 4 = brown.
The evaluation of this situation is that exactly one guessed color (namely red) is right
and in the right place and exactly one guessed color (namely yellow) is right, but in the
123
Learning to Apply Theory of Mind 501
wrong place. John has to choose two feedback sentences to send to Mary, one about
color and one about position. He could communicate:
‘Sommige kleuren zijn goed.’ (‘Some colors are right.’)
and
‘Een kleur staat op de goede plaats.’ (‘There is a color which is in the right
place.’)
This would indicate that John thinks that sommige (some) can be used to refer to exactly
two and that een (a) can be used to refer to exactly one. This is a pragmatic production:
in accordance with Grice’s maxims. If John had instead chosen the sentence ‘Een
kleur is goed’ (‘A color is right)’, then he would allow een (a) to refer to a situation
where exactly two holds. This would be a more logical production (in logic a is true in
case of at least one). Notice that because the sentences were communicated in written
form, through the computer program, intonation and non-verbal communication were
absent.
Mary now has to give her interpretation of the sentences chosen by John. So if she
thinks that, given the first two sentences, it could be the case that two colors are right,
of which one is in the right position, she would submit (black, white) as a possible
interpretation. If she considers the situation where three colors are right, of which
two colors are in the right position, possible as well, she would also submit (black,
black, white). If she would only submit the first possibility, her interpretation would
be pragmatic. If she would also submit the second one, her interpretation would be
more logical.
In the experiment Mary would have to give John feedback about her guess com-
pared to her own secret code as well, and John would then submit his interpretation
of those sentences. Each turn, one player can make a guess, in this example Mary.
During the experiment participants had to answer questions. The purpose of those
questions was to get information on their strategy and the order of the Theory of Mind
they were using. For the same purpose, participants completed a questionnaire after
each session. More details on the experiment can be found in (Mol 2004).
4.3 Predictions
Since players of the game Mastersminds have to perform many actions each turn,
we expect participants to start with a very simple or no strategy. As they get more
experienced in playing the game they will have enough resources left for developing
a more complex strategy.
Grice’s maxims are applicable in situations where conversation is cooperative. Since
a rational strategy for playing the game in the experiment is being as uninformative
as possible, communication will probably not be cooperative in the experimental con-
ditions. So once the participants have mastered the game well enough to think about
strategy and have become familiar with the uncooperative context, we expect them to
develop a less pragmatic use of the sentences.
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Table 1 Highest order of ToM used
1st-Order Possibly 2nd-Order 2nd-Order
3, 5, 6, 7, 12 4 1, 2, 11
8, 9, 10
This table shows the highest order of ToM that participants used during the experiment. The numbers rep-
resent the participants. The order used was determined from the answers participants gave to questions that
were asked during the experiment
We predict that while playing the game, the order of the theory of mind used by
the participants increases. This will lead to the participant considering the amount
of information that is revealed by the feedback sentences chosen, and the amount
of information that will have to be revealed as a result of a guess made (first-order
ToM). The participant will also become aware that his opponent is trying to reveal
little information (second-order ToM). This will lead to a more logical interpretation.
Eventually, the participant may use the knowledge that his opponent knows that he is
trying to hide certain information (third-order ToM).
We also predict that there will be individual differences in what order of ToM will be
used and how logical the language use becomes, as well as in the speed of developing
a better strategy, because there will be individual differences in available processing
capacity. If participants eventually reach logical language use, then this results from a
conscious reasoning process. Therefore, we expect participants to be able to describe
this part of their strategy.
4.4 Results
Participants are numbered from 1 to 12. Participants 10, 11 and 12 completed only
one three hour session.
Three out of twelve participants showed clear signs of the use of second-order ToM
(Table 1). One additional participant probably used second-order ToM as well, but in
this case it was less clear whether the knowledge was applied. An example of second-
order ToM use in this game is that agent 1 makes his guesses based on the assumption
that ‘the guesses made by agent 2 are evasive about agent 2’s own code, since agent
2 does not want agent 1 to know agent 2’s secret code’. All of these four participants
played in accordance with a strategy to be uninformative (Table 2) and had a fairly to
strict logical language use (Table 3).
The remaining eight participants all used first-order ToM. An example of first-order
ToM use in this game is that agent 1 takes into account what agent 2 already knows
about agent 1’s secret code. Two of these participants used the strategy of being unin-
formative and had a fairly logical language use, similar to the participants who used
second-order ToM. The other six used the strategy of being informative or a strategy
which did not consider the amount of information revealed and had a fairly to strict
pragmatic language use.
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Initially 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 11 3, 8, 9, 12 6, 7
Finally 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11 9, 12 2, 3, 6,
7, 8 10
This table shows what kind of strategy participants used during the experiment, initially and finally. The
strategy was determined from answers that participants gave to questions posed during the experiment. The
numbers of the participants who made a shift are in italic in the row that represents the final strategy
Table 3 Language use
Pragmatic Fairly Fairly Logical
pragmatic logical
Initially 8 5, 6, 7, 9, 1, 2, 3, 11
10, 12 4
Finally 6, 7, 9, 10 1, 2, 3, 11
8, 12 4, 5
This table shows the type of productions and interpretations (logical or pragmatic) that participants sub-
mitted during the experiment, initially and finally. The numbers represent the participants. The numbers of
the participants who made a shift are in italic in the row that represents the final language use
Table 4 The preference for uninformative sentences
Preferred less informative Did not prefer less informative
sentences sentences
Initially 1, 3, 4 , 5 , 11 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12
Finally 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12
This table indicates which participants preferred using less informative sentences in production. The num-
bers represent the participants. The numbers of the participants who made a shift are in italic in the row
that represents the final behavior
Participants that stated to have the strategy of being uninformative and had a fairly
to strict logical language use showed a type of behavior which the others did not show
(Table 4). This behavior consists of preferring less informative sentences to more
informative ones in production. For example, favoring sentence 1 over sentence 2 in
a case where, from a logical perspective, they both hold.
1. ‘Some colors are right.’
2. ‘All colors are right.’
All participants who used second-order ToM did so from the start. No shifts in
order of ToM used were observed. Some shifts were measured in language use. One
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participant shifted from a fairly pragmatic to a fairly logical use. This participant used
the strategy to be uninformative. Three participants shifted from a fairly pragmatic to
a fully pragmatic use. They did not use the strategy of being uninformative. The other
participants were constant in their language use.
One participant shifted from using the strategy of being informative to using the
strategy of being uninformative. This participant had a fairly logical language use.
One participant abandoned the strategy of being uninformative, in order to give the
opponent a better chance of winning (!). This participant had a fairly pragmatic use
of language.
The participants using more advanced strategies clearly had to put in little effort to
play the game and understand the computer program used. For example, this could be
concluded from the fact that they made very few mistakes in playing the game by the
rules, as well as from their answers in the questionnaire about their familiarity with
computers and with strategic games. The people with the least advanced strategies
made more mistakes in playing the game than others did.
Most participants wrote down thoughts on the meaning of scalar terms, the terms
they considered possible and their strategy in their answers to the questions posed
during the experiment.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
5.1 Back to the Formal Models for Real People
In interpreting the experimental results, the language of the extended epistemic logic
introduced in Subsect. 2.2 has been beneficial. For example, during the experiment,
participant 1 wrote in an answer to a question that in making a guess, he considered
that the guesses made by his opponent were evasive from his opponent’s secret code,
since he wanted to hide this code. Participant 1 was applying the knowledge that his
opponent wanted to hide his secret code, in other words, that his opponent did not
want him to know his secret code. Let c denote the secret code of participant 1’s
opponent is d, and let participant 1 and his opponent be denoted by agent 1 and agent
2 respectively. Now the fact that participant 1 has this knowledge could be represented
as follows in epistemic logic: K1D2¬K1c.3
As explained in Subsects. 2.1 and 2.2, the order of this knowledge can be found by
counting the operators, as long as the agents are different and the first operator, which
serves to indicate which agent has the knowledge, is left out. The representation of the
knowledge participant 1 has (as opposed to the representation of the fact that partic-
ipant 1 has this knowledge) is: D2¬K1c. Now there are two operators with different
agents, of which the first is not the agent that has the knowledge and thus it can be
concluded that this knowledge is part of a second-order ToM.
3 Here we abuse the language a bit, because in fact participant 1 cannot refer to the real code of participant
2, so the propositional atom c remains vague. For solutions to such problems, see the literature on epistemic
logic for security protocols, e.g. (Teepe 2006).
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5.2 Complex Skills and Strategies
The research question for this study was: To what extent do adults use and acquire
complex skills and strategies, in the domains of reasoning about others and language
use? It was found that four out of twelve participants used all complex skills that
were measured: a strategy of being uninformative, using logical interpretation and
production, and using second-order ToM reasoning. They did so from the start of the
experiment. By the end of the experiment, half of the participants had a logical inter-
pretation and production and also half of the participants had the strategy of being
uninformative. So the complex skills that we investigated were used to a fair extent.
One participant developed the strategy of being uninformative during the exper-
iment. Another participant developed a more logical language use. A third partici-
pant developed a better strategy in production. Altogether, skill acquisition during the
course of the experiment was very limited.
There clearly were individual differences. Some participants did not seem to use
any complex skills or strategies. Some participants even developed a more pragmatic
language use. This may be because the pragmatic meaning of some of the scalar
terms that were used depended on the situation, and hence their interpretation wasn’t
automated yet.
Dual task model : Hypothesis 1 stated that performing a task and simultaneously
reflecting upon this task can be considered dual-tasking. Although participants showed
little development during the experiment, the results are in line with this hypothesis.
Three groups of participants can be discriminated.
The first group consists of the four participants (1, 2, 4, and 11) that showed the
use of all complex skills from the start of the experiment. It could be that the first
task, playing the game according to its rules, was relatively easy for these participants.
They made few or no mistakes, and had relatively much experience in working with
computers and playing strategic games, which indeed points in this direction. Because
the cognitive demands of the first task were small for this group, they could use a
lot of their resources for the second task: reasoning about others. Also, three of them
indicated to have a fair knowledge of logic, which may have helped in performing
the second task, further reducing the total cognitive demands. In sum, their resources
were sufficient to perform both tasks simultaneously.
There were two participants (3 and 5) that eventually had a strategy of being unin-
formative and a logical language use, but did not seem to use second-order ToM. These
participants developed either their strategy or their language use during the experi-
ment. These participants may represent an intermediate stage in which some resources
are available for reflective cognition, but not yet enough to use all the complex skills.
During the experiment the demands of the first tasks may have decreased because
of automation, freeing more resources for the second task and thereby enabling the
development of strategy or language use. These participants had enough resources
available for doing the first task and part of the second task.
The third group consists of the six participants that did not show the use of any
complex skills. It could be that these participants were too occupied with the first task
of playing the game, to be able to also use reflective cognition. In other words, their
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resources may have been insufficient to perform both the first and the second task.
These participants made relatively many mistakes in playing the game, so it could
even be that the demands of the first task alone were too high already. This group may
also include participants that did not think of logical language use as a possible way to
use language. Some of the participants in this group developed strategies which they
described as making things difficult for the opponent, but they did not relate this to
the amount of information they revealed.
The use of quantifiers : Hypothesis 2 stated that in an uncooperative situation, people
will shift their interpretation and production of quantifiers from pragmatic (according
to Grice’s quantity maxim) to less pragmatic (violating Grice’s quantity maxim). None
of the participants developed a more logical language use in the way that was meant
in hypothesis 2. However, by the end of the experiment, half of the participants had a
fairly to strict logical language use! As explained above, it could be the case that these
participants had enough resources left for reflective cognition from the start of the
experiment, so that they could use logical productions and interpretations. (Though
our number of participants is very small, this percentage is comparable to and in
between the percentages of adults giving logically correct responses to pragmatically
infelicitous some sentences in Noveck (2001), and Feeney et al. (2004).
Automated versus deliberate processes : Hypothesis 3 stated that in interpreting and
producing quantifiers, adults make use of an automated process, which results in
pragmatic use of the quantifier, and that this process can be ‘overruled’ by a deliberate
reasoning process, resulting in logical use of the quantifier. It seems that pragmatic
language use is not automated for all adults in the situation of the experiment, since
some participants developed pragmatic language use while repeatedly playing Mas-
ter(s)Mind(s). This could be because of the context-dependent meaning of some of
the scalar terms used.
By the end of the experiment, half of the participants had a non pragmatic language
use. It is unlikely that they were unable to make pragmatic interpretations and produc-
tions, since they were all adults (being unable to draw pragmatic inferences would be
a serious challenge in daily life). Thus, it seems that people can indeed choose to use
language in a non pragmatic way. Since most participants wrote down comments on
their way of interpreting the scalar terms, it seems that changing this interpretation is
indeed a deliberate reasoning process.
Limited Theory of Mind use : It was found that although participants used first-order
ToM, they did not use all kinds of reasoning possible and useful in this context with a
first-order ToM. Most participants were aware of the desire of their opponent to know
their secret code and wanted to make it as difficult as possible for the opponent to
get that knowledge. Most of them considered how their opponent would interpret a
certain feedback sentence. However, only few participants considered what informa-
tion would be revealed, or would have to be revealed as a result of a certain guess
they made themselves. Apparently, participants were more aware of information that
was revealed by their language productions than they were of information that was
revealed by their actions, or that would have to be revealed as a result of their actions.
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Participants who used second-order ToM did use all the reasoning patterns possible
with first-order ToM which were described above. Thus, they considered guesses as
well as sentences to be informative.
5.3 General Discussion and Conclusions
Our experimental results provide some support for our dual-task model of skill acqui-
sition. Though the evidence is not conclusive yet, it does present a problem for the
theory of skill acquisition proposed by Fitts (1964). The performance of participants
who were using second order Theory of Mind, and who were using language in a
logical way, was fast and with relatively few errors. According to Fitts’ theory, this
suggests that these skills result from automated processes. However, these partici-
pants were able to explicitly write down their reasoning about their opponent and their
thoughts about the use of quantifiers. In other words, they had full deliberate access to
their skills, whereas Fitts predicted that deliberate access to automated skills is limited.
Our dual-task model is not challenged by the same problem. In our view skill acqui-
sition is a continuous interplay between deliberate and automated processes. Because,
for the advanced participants, performance was (partly) automated, they could apply
reflective cognition to their advanced strategies for the game. Notice however that
we do use Fitts’ description of the process of automation as a building block for our
dual-task model.
Fitts’ theory predicts that the autonomous stage is reached by repeated performance
of the task. Only a few participants in our experiment were able to benefit from repeat-
edly playing the game. Yet some participants who had never played this particular
game before were able to use all complex skills from the start. Our dual-task model of
skill acquisition gives a more elegant explanation for this than does Fitts’ theory. These
advanced players manage to benefit from other skills that they master, by applying
them to the new context. In Fitts’ theory however this is not possible, since deliberate
access to such mastered skills is limited.
Our results corroborate well-known findings of Colman and others that most players
easily manage first-order ToM, while many players are limited to first-order reasoning
and almost all are limited to second-order reasoning (Colman 2003; Hedden and Zhang
2002). However, our research does not corroborate Hedden and Zhang’s conclusions
about skill acquisition (particularly second order ToM reasoning) during game play-
ing (Hedden and Zhang 2002). When Hedden and Zhang asked players to predict the
other’s moves in a game, it turned out that participants started out with the default
assumption that their opponent would not model them. When in subsequent turns the
opponent took a first-order strategy, the subject would switch to second-order predic-
tions (but see (Flobbe et al. 2008; Colman 2003) for criticism of Hedden and Zhang’s
methodology). Our findings do not show such an improvement of Theory of Mind use
during the course of the repeated games. Instead, they are much more in line with the
results of Flobbe et al., who in another context also find that their adult subjects start
the experiment with proficiency in either first-order or second-order applied ToM,
and do not move up the hierarchy of ToM when being exposed to the game for a
number of different trials (Flobbe et al. 2008). Thus, the use of ToM, as well as the
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development of this skill were very limited in our study, even though most of our
participants were advanced university students. Our results provide a warning against
assuming that because some people (such as trained logicians) on some occasions
apply higher-order Theory of Mind, such reasoning is at all widespread.
6 Future Work
In future work, more evidence for or against hypothesis 1 needs to be found. The
difficulty of the first task—playing the game correctly—needs to be varied, in order
to investigate whether this influences the use of skills that result from reflective cog-
nition. In the Mastersminds-experiment, there are several ways to do so. The interface
of the computer program used could be made less user-friendly, time pressure could
be added, and the number of colors in a secret code could be varied. Also, a less
well-known game similar to Mastersminds could be used, because most people know
the regular version of the game Mastermind, which can be a benefit in playing Mas-
tersminds. During the experiment, some participants got tired. In future experiments,
fatigue could be measured by determining physical parameters, e.g. heart rate and
blood pressure, in order to gauge to what extent advanced cognitive skills suffer from
fatigue, which could be a measure for how much effort they require and thus how well
they are mastered.
An improvement in the experimental setup should be made in order to better be
able to measure complex skills and strategies. Participants with pragmatic language
use had a disadvantage in strategy development. A strong strategy for this game is to
reveal little information. The less informative sentences that logical language users
could prefer often were regarded as false by pragmatic language users so that they
could not use these sentences. By including more expressions, such as for example
niet alle (not all), the possibilities for pragmatic language users can be increased. In
addition, logical language use should be taught to participants prior to the experiment,
to make sure that all participants are aware of the possibility of using language in this
way. Also, participants’ motivation to use second order ToM could be increased by
giving them a reward depending on the number of trials they need to correctly guess
the opponents’ secret code, and the number of trials the opponent needs to guess
their secret code correctly. Finally, in the experiment, order of ToM was measured
by the way participants described their strategies in the questionnaire. Unfortunately,
talk-aloud protocols do not suffice for acquiring correct information about subjects’
knowledge and reasoning strategies (Nisbett and Wilson 1977). Thus, it would be good
to also test order of ToM separately, for example by story tasks such as those used
in (Flobbe et al. 2008).
An alternative for hypothesis 2 could be: In an uncooperative conversation, some
people will use quantifiers in a way that is not in accordance with Grice’s quantity
maxim, but that is more truth-conditional. To test this hypothesis, it should be inves-
tigated whether the cooperativeness of the situation has an influence on language use.
This could be done by observing the language use of the participants who had a logical
language use during the Mastersminds-experiment, while they play a fully cooperative
game, in which a mutual goal has to be reached by two or more players.
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To make it more clear whether or not logical language use can only result from
overruling pragmatic language use, as stated in Hypothesis 3, it would be interesting
to let the participants to the Mastersminds experiment do an experiment like the one
that was conducted by Feeney et al. on the interpretation of scalar terms in sentences
like ‘Some fish can swim’ (Feeney et al. 2004). This could also be done for other scalar
terms than some. Such an experiment could reveal whether the participants who had
a logical language use from the start still need to overrule their pragmatic language
use. If participants were to complete such an experiment before and after doing the
Mastersminds-experiment, people who have shifted to more logical use are expected
to have increased reaction times, since they now have to overrule their automated
interpretation process.
Finally, our future project will be designing logical models that are less idealized
than the usual epistemic logic S5 described in Subsect. 2.2 and that more accurately
model different types of human reasoning on several orders of ToM. Thus far, there
have been no logical models of human reasoning at higher orders of Theory of Mind.
Stenning and Van Lambalgen have presented an interesting logical model of human
reasoning in false-belief tasks that test for first-order ToM, based on closed-world
reasoning as used in non-monotonic logics (Stenning and van Lambalgen 2008). Van
Ditmarsch and Labuschagne model different types of shortcomings in first-order ToM
using frame-definable properties of different agents’ preference relations (where an
agent prefers one state over another if he considers it more likely) (Van Ditmarsch and
Labuschagne 2007). For example, autists might think that ‘another agent’s preferences
are exactly similar to my own’.4
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